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Abstract
A number scales have been developed to measure conspiracist ideation, but little attention
has been paid to the factorial validity of these scales. We reassessed the psychometric
properties of four widely-used scales, namely the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory
(BCTI), the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ), the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs
Scale (GCBS), and the One-Item Conspiracy Measure (OICM). Eight-hundred-and-three U.
S. adults completed all measures, along with measures of endorsement of 9/11 and anti-
vaccination conspiracy theories. Through both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis,
we found that only the BCTI had acceptable factorial validity. We failed to confirm the factor
structures of the CMQ and the GBCS, suggesting these measures had poor factorial valid-
ity. Indices of convergent validity were acceptable for the BCTI, but weaker for the other
measures. Based on these findings, we provide suggestions for the future refinement in the
measurement of conspiracist ideation.
Introduction
In tandem with growing scholarly interest in the psychology of conspiracy theories [1],
researchers have developed a range of different scales to measure individual differences in con-
spiracist ideation, which we define broadly here as a tendency to endorse conspiracy theories
or engage in conspiracist thinking. With few exceptions, however, most of these newly devel-
oped scales have not been subjected to thorough investigations of their psychometric proper-
ties. In particular, little attention has been paid to the factorial and convergent validity, and
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internal consistency, of these scales, which is concerning because scholars may be inadver-
tently introducing a degree of bias into their studies [2].
In this article, we review current approaches to measuring individual differences in conspir-
acist ideation. In brief, two different approaches are evident in the literature: (a) measuring
conspiracist ideation in terms of endorsement of a range of real-world conspiracy theories,
and; (b) measuring conspiracist ideation in generic terms without reference to real-world con-
spiracy theories. We review the different scales that have been developed in alignment with
these approaches and highlight their measurement-related deficiencies, particularly in terms
of factorial validity. In addition, we report on a new dataset from U.S. participants, via which
we re-examine the psychometric properties of four measures of conspiracist ideation. This
allows for the most comprehensive assessment of such scales to date and allows us to make rec-
ommendations for their future use.
Endorsement of a range of conspiracy theories
Most early scales that were developed to measure conspiracist ideation relied on a similar
underlying principle: that by presenting participants with a range of real-world conspiracy the-
ories (e.g., the moon landings were faked), it would be possible to obtain an overall measure of
conspiracist ideation (or, more accurately, global endorsement of conspiracy theories). A
number of such scales have been developed (see Table 1), including the Belief in Specific Con-
spiracies Scale [3], the Conspiracy Theory Belief Scale [4], the Composite Conspiracy Beliefs
Scales [5], and the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory [6]. These scales vary widely in
terms of the information provided about scale development, item construction and content,
number of items, and internal consistency. Importantly, there has been a tendency for scholars
to treat these scales as factorially unidimensional (i.e, by computing total scores) in the absence
of analyses of their factor structures [3–5] or to treat the items individually [7].
To date, only two of these measures have been subjected to factor analysis. One study [8]
submitted the 17 items of the Conspiracy Theory Belief Scale to exploratory factor analysis
(EFA) and extracted two distinct factors relating to generic conspiracy theories and climate
change conspiracy theories. However, it is not apparent that the study had a sufficiently large
size (N = 138) by conservative participant-to-item standards (i.e., a participant-to-item ratio of
10:1) [9] to conduct EFA. Moreover, the authors [8] elected to compute a total score (Cron-
bach α = .78), arguing that item inter-correlations were high. This is problematic because item
inter-correlations and high internal consistencies may still mask underlying latent factors [10]
and, in any event, the internal consistency of the total score was below what has described as
acceptable for novel measures (i.e., a internal consistency coefficient of .80) [9]. Other studies
using this measure have likewise computed total scores and have reported higher internal con-
sistency coefficients [11–13], but have neglected to examine the scale’s factor structure. At least
one study [12] has also used a truncated version of this scale in the absence of an examination
of the scale’s dimensionality.
A different measure is the Belief in Conspiracy Theory Inventory (BCTI) [6]. In the parent
study, the authors [6] subjected a pool of 15 items to EFA and reported that all but one of the
items loaded onto a primary factor. They, therefore, computed a total BCTI score as the mean
of the 14 remaining items, a method that has been used in one other study [14]. In a later study
[15], an additional item was added to the list of 14 items and a total score was computed, but
the authors neglected to report on the factorial validity of this adapted measure. Subsequent
studies have mostly used the 15-item version of the BCTI and, although acceptable internal
consistency coefficients have been reported [16], none of these studies have re-examined the
factorial validity of the BCTI. In addition, the measure has been translated into German [15]
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Table 1. Scales that measure endorsement of a range of conspiracy theories.
Measure Reference Language N No. of items Anchors Factorial
validity
Cronbach
α
Test-
retest
reliability
Convergent
validity
Belief in
Specific
Conspiracies
Scale
[3] English 156 US
university
students
22 1 = Strongly
disagree, 7 =
Strongly agree
Not
examined
.89 Not
examined
None
Belief in
Conspiracy
Theories
Scale
[47], Study
1
English 30 UK
undergraduates
8 1 = Strongly
disagree, 5 =
Strongly agree
Not
examined
Not
reported
Not
examined
Correlation with
attribution of
novel event to
conspiracy not
significant, r < .01
[47], Study
2
English 86 UK
undergraduates
8 1 = Strongly
disagree, 5 =
Strongly agree
Not
examined
Not
reported
Not
examined
None
Composite
Conspiracy
Beliefs Scale
[5], Study
2a
Dutch 1,010 Dutch
adults,
representative
of the
Netherlands
6 1 = Highly
probably, 7 =
Highly
improbable
Not
examined
.80 Not
examined
None
[5], Study
2b
Dutch 1,297 Dutch
adults,
representative
of the
Netherlands
6 1 = Highly
probably, 7 =
Highly
improbable
Not
examined
.82 Not
examined
None
[5], Study
3
Dutch 268 Dutch
adults from an
online sample
9 1 = Highly
probably, 7 =
Highly
improbable
Not
examined
.86 Not
examined
None
[7], Study
2
Dutch 1256 US adults
from online
samples
5 1 = Definitely
false, 5 =
Definitely true
Not
examined
Items
treated
individually
Not
examined
None
Conspiracy
Theory
Beliefs Scale
[4], Study
1
English 189 UK
undergraduates
17 1 = Never under
any
circumstances,
7 = Probably
yes
Not
examined
.82 Not
examined
None
[4], Study
2
English 60 UK
undergraduates
17 1 = Never under
any
circumstances,
7 = Probably
yes
Not
examined
Not
reported
Not
examined
None
[8], Study
1
English 137 UK
undergraduates
17 1 = Strongly
disagree, 7 =
Strongly agree
EFA
revealed two
factors
measuring
generic
conspiracy
theories and
climate
change
conspiracy
theories
Total scale
= .78;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
None
[12], Study
1
English 202 online
adults, location
unspecified
7 1 = Strongly
disagree, 7 =
Strongly agree
Not
examined
.82 Not
examined
None
[12], Study
2
English 328 online
adults, location
unspecified
17 1 = Strongly
disagree, 7 =
Strongly agree
Not
examined
.87 Not
examined
None
(Continued )
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Table 1. (Continued)
Measure Reference Language N No. of items Anchors Factorial
validity
Cronbach
α
Test-
retest
reliability
Convergent
validity
[11], Study
1
English 91 UK adults
from the
community
Not reported
(17
presumed)
1 = Strongly
disagree, 7 =
Strongly agree
Not
examined
.96 Not
examined
None
[13], Study
1
English 186 UK
university
students
12 1 = Extremely
unlikely, 7 =
Extremely likely
Not
examined
.90 Not
examined
None
Belief in
Conspiracy
Theories
Inventory
[6] English 257 adults
representative
of UK population
15 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Principal axis
EFA: 14
items load
onto primary
factor, 1 item
dropped
.86 Not
examined
Measure of 9/11
conspiracist
beliefs, r = .55
[14] English 914 UK adults
from the
community
14 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.89 Not
examined
Measure of belief
in conspiracy
theories about
the
disappearance of
Amelia Earhart, r
= .12
[15], Study
1
English 817 UK adults
from the
community
15 (14 from
parent study
plus on item
about 9/11
conspiracy
theory)
1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.90 Not
examined
Measure of 7/7
bombings
conspiracist
beliefs, r = .75
[16] English 259 US adults
from online
sample
15 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.93 Not
examined
None
[48], Study
1
English 990 UK adults
from the
community
15 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.91 Not
examined
None
[48], Study
2
English 112 UK
undergraduates
15 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.87-.89 Not
examined
None
[48], Study
3
English 189 UK
undergraduates
15 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.88-.90 Not
examined
None
[49] English 420 US adults
from online
sample
15 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.92 Not
examined
None
[50] English 447 adults
mainly from UK
and US, from
online sample
15 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.92 Not
examined
None
[15], Study
2)
German 281 central
European adults
from the
community
15 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.87 Not
examined
Measure of belief
in a fictitious
conspiracy
theory, r = .55
[51] German 281 and 273
central
European adults
from the
community
15 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.87 Not
examined
Measure of belief
in conspiracy
theory about
Natascha
Kampusch, rs =
.56-.59
(Continued )
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and Malay [17], but in both instances the scale translators have not reported on the dimension-
ality of the measure. A shorter, 10-item version of the scale has also been translated into French
[18], but again a total score was computed in the absence of evidence of a one-factor structure.
In addition to the lack of evidence of factorial validity, these scales also suffer from a num-
ber of additional problems. As noted in Table 1, very few of these studies have provided esti-
mates of convergent validity for the scales being used. Response options have also varied
between studies for some scales and sample sizes in the studies have varied widely. Perhaps
the most problematic aspect of these scales, however, relates to their construct validity. It is
not clear to what extent these scales measure anything other than belief in a set of real-world
Table 1. (Continued)
Measure Reference Language N No. of items Anchors Factorial
validity
Cronbach
α
Test-
retest
reliability
Convergent
validity
[52], Study
1
German 192 central
European adults
from the
community
15 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.88 Not
examined
Measure of belief
in moon landings
conspiracy
theories, r = .59
[52], Study
2
German 392 central
European adults
from the
community
15 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.86 Not
examined
Measure of belief
in moon landings
conspiracy
theories, r = .54
[53] German 494 central
European adults
from the
community
15 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.90 Not
examined
None
[54], Study
1
English 107 Australian
adults
(unspecified)
15 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.93 Not
examined
Measure of belief
in 9/11
conspiracy
theories, r = .77
[54], Study
2
English 121 Australian
adults
(unspecified)
15 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.94 Not
examined
Measure of belief
in fictitious
conspiracy
theory, r = .78;
Measure of ‘true’
conspiracy
theories, r = .75;
GCB, r = 83;
CMQ, r = .62
[17], Study
1
Malay 368 Malay
adults from the
community in
Malaysia
15 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.90 Not
examined
Measure of belief
in Jewish
conspiracy
theory, r = .22
[17], Study
2
Malay 314 Malay
adults from the
community in
Malaysia
15 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.88 Not
examined
Measure of belief
in Jewish
conspiracy
theory, r = .17
[18], Study
1
French 152 French
Masters
students
10 selected to
be
recognisable
to French
audience
1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.83 Not
examined
Single-item
conspiracy
theory, r = .50;
GCB, r = .66;
CMQ, r = .38
[18], Study
2
English 292 US adults
from online
sample
15 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
examined
.85 Not
examined
Single-item
conspiracy
theory, r = .66,
GCB, r = .83;
CMQ, r = .65
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172617.t001
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conspiracy theories. Even if we accept that they measure individual differences in conspira-
cist ideation, such scales may be impractical, requiring constant updating to reflect changes
in the popularity of particular conspiracy theories or to reflect local knowledge of conspiracy
theories.
Measures of generic conspiracist ideation
Some scholars have developed measures of generic conspiracist ideation that do not make ref-
erence to specific conspiracy theories. Such generic conspiracist ideation, would in turn be
expected to be positively associated with endorsement of specific conspiracy theories. There
are a number of such scales (see Table 2), including the Conspiracy Theory Questionnaire
[19], a subscale of the Epistemically Unwarranted Beliefs Scale [20], the Conspiracy Mentality
Questionnaire (CMQ) [21], and the Generic Conspiracist Belief Scale (GCBS) [22]. Notably,
the former two scales have not been subjected to factor analysis and one-factor structures have
been assumed in the absence of empirical evidence in their favour. The latter two scales have
been subjected to EFA and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), but likewise suffer from a
number of limitations.
To take the CMQ first, two different versions of this scale appear to exist in the literature: a
12-item version [23] and a 5-item version [21]. The first of these has been subjected to CFA,
which showed a one-factor solution to have acceptable fit, but CFA is an inappropriate analytic
strategy for a novel scale. CFA indicates whether a hypothesised model has adequate fit, but
tells scholars little about whether there may be alternative, better-fitting models. In addition,
the authors [23] also appear to have neglected to report on the response option for this 12-item
measure. On the other hand, the 5-item version has been subjected to EFA [21], with a one-
factor solution extracted. Additionally, multi-group CFA showed that the one-dimensional
model had adequate fit in German- and English-speaking samples, but indices for a Turkish-
speaking sample were problematic. Even so, the 5-item CMQ may be difficult-to-understand
and some studies have reported internal consistency coefficients below an acceptable cut-off
[9] (see Table 2).
Further problems with the CMQ include insufficient information about its construction
and original item pool, as well as concerns related to its construct validity (i.e., it is not entirely
clear that all items in the scale reflect conspiracist ideation, which may explain its low internal
consistency in some studies). More specifically, of the five items included in the CMQ, only
two (items #4 and #5 may directly assess conspiracist ideation as it is currently conceived. Item
#3 is almost certainly factual, but may not necessarily require an underlying conspiracist belief.
Items #1 and #2 likewise could be construed as statements of fact, without any underlying con-
spiracist motive.
The GCBS is perhaps the most widely used measure of generic conspiracist ideation. In the
parent study, the authors [22] reported on the development of a pool of 75 initial items, which
was reduced to 59 follow exclusion of negatively-worded items. Based on an EFA of the
remaining items, five factors with acceptable internal consistencies were extracted. In a second
study [22], the authors selected 15 “representative” items and reported that CFA showed a five-
factor model to have acceptable fit and better fit than a one-factor model with all 15 items.
Even so, they and all subsequent studies using the GCBS have shown a preference to work with
total scores. Two further problems limit the validity of the GCBS. First, the authors did not
have a sufficiently large sample size to conduct EFA in the parent study; further examinations
of the scale’s factor structure were also conducted with small samples with suspect generalisa-
bility (see Table 2). Second, the GCBS has been translated into French [24] and Macedonian
[25], but factorial validity in these new cultural contexts has not been investigated.
Conspiracist ideation
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Table 2. Scales that measure generic conspiracist ideation.
Measure Reference Language N No. of items Anchors Factorial
validity
Cronbach
α
Test-
retest
reliability
Convergent
validity
Conspiracy
Theory
Questionnaire
[19] English 120 UK
university
students
38 1 = Extremely
unlikely, 9 =
Certainly
Not
examined
.96 Not
examined
None
[55] English 223 mixed
sample
38 1 = Certainly
not, 11 =
Certainly
Not
examined
.72 Not
examined
Measure of
generic
conspiracist
beliefs, r = .56;
endorsement of
alternative
explanations for
historical events,
r = .63
Conspiracy
Mentality
Questionnaire
[23], Study
1a
English 497 adults from
online sample
(location not
reported)
12 Not reported CFA
showed that
a one-factor
model had
adequate fit
.90 Not
examined
None
[23], Study
1b
German 133 adults
(recruitment not
specified)
12 Not reported Not
examined
Not
reported
15-day
interval, r
= .88
None
[23], Study
1c
German 63 adults
(recruitment not
specified)
12 Not reported Not
examined
Not
reported
1-year
interval, r
= .67
None
[23], Study
2
German 294 adults from
online sample
12 Not reported Not
examined
.89 Not
examined
None
[23], Study
3
German 280 German
university
students
12 Not reported Not
examined
.89 Not
examined
None
[23], Study
4
German 280 German
university
students
12 Not reported Not
examined
.89 Not
examined
None
[23], Study
5
German 1852 German
adults from
online sample
12 Not reported Not
examined
.89 Not
examined
None
[21], Study
1a
German,
English, and
Turkish
7766 online
adults from
Germany, UK,
US, Ireland, and
Turkey
5 0% =
Certainly not,
100% =
Certain
EFA, one-
factor
model
extracted;
multi-group
CFA
showed
adequate fit
across
groups
.72
(Turkish),
.84
(English
and
German)
Not
examined
Endorsement of
33 conspiracy
theories, rs = .37-
.76
[21], Study
1b
German 133 German
university
students
5 0% =
Certainly not,
100% =
Certain
Not
examined
.77-.82 15-day
interval, r
= .84
None
[21], Study
2
English 120 UK
university
students
5 0% =
Certainly not,
100% =
Certain
Not
examined
.85 Not
examined
Endorsement of
33 conspiracy
theories, rs = .30-
.81
[21], Study
3
English 76 UK adults
from the
community
5 0% =
Certainly not,
100% =
Certain
Not
examined
.73 Not
examined
Endorsement of
33 conspiracy
theories, rs = .20-
.69
(Continued )
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Table 2. (Continued)
Measure Reference Language N No. of items Anchors Factorial
validity
Cronbach
α
Test-
retest
reliability
Convergent
validity
[21], Study
4
German 274 German
university
students
5 0% =
Certainly not,
100% =
Certain
Not
examined
.78 Not
examined
Novel conspiracy
mentality
questionnaire, r =
.82;
Endorsement of
33 conspiracy
theories, rs = .32-
.68
[54], Study
2
English 121 Australian
adults
(unspecified)
5 0% =
Certainly not,
100% =
Certain
Not
examined
.84 Not
examined
Measure of belief
in fictitious
conspiracy
theory, r = .61;
Measure of ‘true’
conspiracy
theories, r = .51;
BCTI, r = 62;
GCB, r = .65
[18], Study
1
French 152 French
Masters
students
5 0% =
Certainly not,
100% =
Certain
Not
examined
.79 Not
examined
Single-item
conspiracy
theory, r = .41;
BCTI-10, r = .38;
GCB, r = .55
[18], Study
2
English 292 US adults
from online
sample
5 0% =
Certainly not,
100% =
Certain
Not
examined
.84 Not
examined
Single-item
conspiracy
theory, r = .70,
BCTI, r = .65;
GCB, r = .75
Epistemically
Unwarranted
Beliefs Scale
[20] English 480 US
undergraduates
10 1 = Strongly
disagree, 5 =
Strongly
agree
Not
examined
.67 Not
examined
None
Generic
Conspiracist
Belief Scale
[22], Study
1
English 489 mixed US
and UK
undergraduates
Originally 75
(59 following
EFA)
1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
EFA on 59
positively
worded
items; 5
factors
extracted
Subscales
.87-.95;
Total score
not
reported
Not
examined
None
[22], Study
2
English 225 UK
undergraduates
15 selected to
be
representative
of 5 factors in
Study 1
1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
CFA of
5-factor
model
showed
adequate
fit; 5-factor
model had
better fit
than
1-factor
model
Total score
= .93;
subscales
not
reported
5-week
interval, r
= .89
BCTI (n = 202), r
= .82; measure of
9/11 conspiracy
theories
(n = 206), r = .75;
7/7 conspiracy
theories
(n = 205), r = .67;
fictitious
conspiracy
theory (n = 209),
r = .61
[22], Study
3
English 208 UK adults
from Psychology
of Paranormal e-
list
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .95;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
BCTI, r = .86
(Continued )
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Table 2. (Continued)
Measure Reference Language N No. of items Anchors Factorial
validity
Cronbach
α
Test-
retest
reliability
Convergent
validity
[22], Study
4
English 194 mixed US
and UK adults
from online
sample
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .95;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
None
[48], Study
4
English 140 UK adults
from the
community
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .91;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
Measure of 7/7
bombings
conspiracist
beliefs, r not
reported
[54], Study
2
English 121 Australian
adults
(unspecified)
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .95;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
Measure of belief
in fictitious
conspiracy
theory, r = .68;
Measure of ‘true’
conspiracy
theories, r = .60;
BCTI, r = 83;
CMQ, r = .65
[18], Study
1
French 152 French
Masters
students
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .85;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
Single-item
conspiracy
theory, r = .50;
BCTI-10, r = .66;
CMQ, r = .55
[18], Study
2
English 292 US adults
from online
sample
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .94;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
Single-item
conspiracy
theory, r = .72,
BCTI, r = .83;
CMQ, r = .75
[11] English 95 UK
undergraduates
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .88;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
None
[56], Study
1
English 84 UK
undergraduates
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .90;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
None
[56], Study
2
English 102 UK
Psychology
undergraduates
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .88;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
None
[56], Study
3
English 84 Psychology
students
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .92;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
None
[57] Not
specified
(English
presumed)
150 adults from
multiple
countries
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .97;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
None
(Continued )
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One-Item Conspiracy Measure
To the above list of measures, one study [18] recently added a one-item measure of conspiracist
ideation. Although this measure was designed for use when scholars are pressed for time, and
Table 2. (Continued)
Measure Reference Language N No. of items Anchors Factorial
validity
Cronbach
α
Test-
retest
reliability
Convergent
validity
[58] Not
specified
(English
presumed)
209 Canadian
undergraduates
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .92;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
None
[24], Study
1
French 107 French
Psychology
undergraduates
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .85;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
Measure of
‘classical’
conspiracy
theories, r = .46
[24], Study
2
French 123 French
Psychology
undergraduates
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .82;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
Measure of
‘classical’
conspiracy
theories, r = .68
[24], Study
3
French 213 French
adults from
online sample
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .88;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
Measure of
‘classical’
conspiracy
theories, r = .63
[59], Study
1
English 150 US adults
from online
sample
15, converted
to the form of
questions
1 = Not at all
likely, 5 =
Extremely
likely
Not
examined
Total score
= .95;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
Endorsement of
5 US historical
conspiracy
theories, r = .75
[59], Study
2
English 802 US adults
from online
sample
15, converted
to the form of
questions
1 = Not at all
likely, 5 =
Extremely
likely
Not
examined
Total score
= .93;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
None
[60], Study
1
English 202 US adults
from online
sample
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .93;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
None
[60], Study
1
English 269 US adults
from online
sample
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .91;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
None
[25] Macedonian 160 Macedonian
adults from an
online sample
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .91;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
None
[61] English 202 US adults
from online
sample
15 1 = Definitely
not true,
5 = Definitely
true
Not
examined
Total score
= .95;
subscales
not
reported
Not
examined
None
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172617.t002
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although it is not possible to examine the factor structure or report on the internal consistency
of this measure, the authors reported that the one-item measure had adequate patterns of con-
vergent validity (see Table 3) and acceptable test-retest reliability after 14 days (r = .75). Given
the issues discussed above concerning dimensionality of conspiracist ideation, it is not imme-
diately apparent to what extent a one-item measure offers practical utility over other measures
that are already relatively brief. Moreover, in some cases (see Table 3), convergent validity esti-
mates that have been reported for the scale have been moderate at best, raising questions about
the extent to which it truly captures individual differences in conspiracist ideation.
One-dimensional or multi-dimensional?
The issues discussed above should give pause to scholars who want to operationalise and mea-
sure individual differences in conspiracist ideation. While there has been a proliferation of a
range of conspiracist ideation scales, measurement issues have not been paid adequate atten-
tion. This has resulted in a number of scales with uncertain psychometric properties. Where
factor structures have been examined, it is not immediately clear that scholars have applied
basic guidelines for conducting factor analyses, explored the possibility of alternative models,
critically appraised the decision(s) to utilise total scores, or re-examined factorial validity when
the scales were used in new linguistic or cultural groups. In other instances, scholars have not
fully reported on scale construction, making it difficult for scholars interested in replication
efforts. These are all issues that have the potential to substantially hamper efforts to measure
conspiracist ideation.
In addition, there remains some confusion in the theoretical foundations that have led to
the construction of the afore-mentioned scales, particularly as to whether conspiracist ideation
can be considered to be a one-dimensional or multi-dimensional construct. In terms of scales
that measure endorsement of a range of conspiracy theories, the available evidence would
seem to suggest that such measures should be one-dimensional. This is based on the finding
that belief in conspiracy theories tends to be “monological” [6, 26]. That is, belief in one con-
spiracy theory tends to make assimilation of other conspiracy theories more likely; as such,
when participants are asked to complete measures that tap endorsement of multiple conspir-
acy theories, one should expect a monological belief system in which belief in a range of con-
spiracy theories are inter-correlated.
The dimensionality of conspiracist ideation, on the other hand, remains an open question.
Although it is possible that conspiracist ideation is multi-dimensional, consisting of discrete
beliefs about multiple conspiratorial acts [22], in practice most scholars have assumed that
Table 3. One-Item Conspiracy Measure.
Measure Reference Language N No. of
items
Anchors Factorial
validity
Cronbach
α
Test-retest
reliability
Convergent
validity
One-Item
Conspiracy
Measure
Lantian, Muller,
Nurra, &
Douglas (2016,
Study 1)
French 152 French
Masters students
1 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
possible
Not
possible
Not
examined
GCB, r = .50;
BCTI-10, r = .50;
CMQ, r = .41
Lantian, Muller,
Nurra, &
Douglas (2016,
Study 2)
English 292 US adults from
online sample
1 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
possible
Not
possible
Not
examined
GCB, r = .72;
BCTI, r = .66;
CMQ, r = .70
Lantian, Muller,
Nurra, &
Douglas (2016,
Study 3)
French 73 French
Psychology
undergraduates
1 1 = Completely
false, 9 =
Completely true
Not
possible
Not
possible
14-day
interval, r =
.75
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172617.t003
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conspiracist ideation should be considered an internally coherent and one-dimensional trait.
This is reflected in the use of total scores for the GCBS, as well as a one-dimensional factor
structure of the CMQ. Likewise, the one-item measure of conspiracist ideation assumes that
the construct can be reduced to a single dimension. Such assumptions appear to be predicated
on the idea that conspiracist ideation can be considered to be a latent personality trait, akin to
paranormal beliefs for example. While such an assumption seems intuitively plausible, it needs
to be rigorously tested before firm conclusions can be drawn.
The present study
Additional research is clearly needed to increase researchers’ understanding of, and confidence
in, measures used to assess conspiracist ideation. Here, we sought to cast fresh light on some of
these measurement issues (i.e., factorial validity, convergent validity, and internal consistency)
vis-à-vis the BCTI, the GCBS, the CMQ, and the one-item conspiracy measure. The three for-
mer measures were selected because they are currently the most widely-used measures in the
literature and also because their parent studies have reported on the factorial validity of the
measures. In addition, we included the one-item measure because it is the most recently vali-
dated. We elected to omit the Conspiracy Theory Belief Scale for a number of reasons: there
appears to be a good deal of item overlap between items in this measure and the BCTI, and
responses scales for this measure have varied across studies (see Table 1). In addition, unlike
the BCTI (its most closely comparable scale), the GCBS, and the CMQ, the Conspiracy Theory
Belief Scale has been used only relatively infrequently in the literature.
In terms of factorial validity, we gathered data from a large U.S. sample of adults, which
allowed us to first examine the factor structures of these measures using EFA (to suggest an
acceptable, best-fitting structure) and then use CFA in a randomly-selected split-half of the
sample (to cross-validate the models). In terms of convergent validity, in addition to assessing
scale inter-correlations, we also included a measure of belief in a 9/11 conspiracy theory (i.e.,
the belief that the September 11, 2011, terrorist attacks were orchestrated or allowed to occur
by the U.S. government) and an anti-vaccination conspiracy theory (i.e., the belief that vacci-
nations do not serve their intended purpose). Finally, we also re-assessed internal consistency
coefficients of the four target scales using Nunnally’s [9] widely-cited, but often incorrectly
interpreted, criterion.
Materials and methods
Ethics statement
This study was conducted in accordance with the principles expressed in the Declaration of
Helsinki and was approved by the ethics committee of the Department of Psychology, Univer-
sity of Westminster (application number: VRE1516-1352). All participants provided written
informed consent.
Procedures and participants
The study was approved by the relevant university ethics committee. Data were collected via
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) website on May 6–7, 2016. MTurk is a crowdsourcing
Internet marketplace that allows individuals and businesses (Requesters) to ask “workers” to
complete tasks for payment. MTurk samples are increasingly being used in psychological stud-
ies, as it provides a source of high-quality data, and have been reported to be more demograph-
ically-diverse than standard Internet samples [27]. The project was advertised as a study on
“political opinions and attitudes” and included an estimated duration and compensation. The
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questionnaire was advertised to MTurk workers who achieved a> 98% approval rate and
completed at least 1,000 hits. We limited participation to MTurk workers from the U.S. so as
to achieve a relatively homogeneous sample in terms of cultural identity. After providing
informed consent, participants were directed to the measures described below, which were
presented in an anonymous form and in random order via the randomisation function with
Qualtrics, which hosted the survey. In exchange for completing the survey, participants were
paid $0.75. Forty-six participants with large amounts of missing data (i.e., missing more than
10% of the total data across all measures) [28] were excluded from the dataset prior to analyses.
For all remaining participants, missing data (< 0.2% of total dataset) were completely at ran-
dom (based on Little’s MCAR analyses), so we used the mean replacement technique to esti-
mate missing values. All participants received debriefing information at the end of the survey.
The final sample consisted of 448 women and 355 men, ranging in age from 18 to 70 years
(M = 37.07, SD = 11.94). The majority of participants self-reported as White (84.4%), while
6.1% were of African American ancestry, 5.6% of Asian ancestry, and 3.8% as some other eth-
nic background. In terms of educational qualifications, 27.3% had completed high school,
4.0% were still in full-time education, 49.7% had an undergraduate degree, 15.6% had a post-
graduate degree, and the remainder had some other qualification. In terms of marital status,
43.7% were married, 27.3% were single and not currently partners, 22.2% were partnered by
not married, 5.4% were divorced, and the remainder were of another marital status.
Measures
Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory. The version of the BCTI that we used was the
15-item, adapted version [15]. This version includes 14 items from the parent study [6] and an
additional item added in a subsequent study [15]. The factor structure of this adapted version
of the BCTI has not been previously investigated, but researchers have assumed that it retains
its parent, one-factor structure. Internal consistency coefficients for this one-factor solution
have tended to be acceptable (see Table 1). In the present study, all items were rated on a
9-point scale, ranging from 1 (Completely false) to 9 (Completely true). Higher scores on this
scale reflect greater endorsement of a range of real-world conspiracy theories. BCTI items are
reported in Table 4.
Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire. Although there are 12- and 5-item version of the
CMQ, we used the 5-item version of the scale because this is the more widely-used measure in
the literature (see Table 2). Bruder et al. [21] reported that the 5-item CMQ had a one-dimen-
sional structure using EFA and that the fit was adequate in German- and English-speaking
samples using multi-group CFA. Although the response scale for this measure may be criti-
cised for being difficult-to-understand, we maintained its original format in the present study.
Participants were asked to respond on an 11-point scale ranging from 0% (Certainly not) to
100% (Certain). Higher scores on this scale reflect greater generic conspiracist ideation. CMQ
items are reported in Table 5.
Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale. We used the 15-item version of the GCBS proposed
[22]. The 15 items were selected by Brotherton and colleagues [22] from a larger pool of items
to be representative of the five-factor solution reported in the parent study. The authors [22]
reported that a five-factor solution had adequate fit using CFA and that this model also had
better fit than a one-factor solution with all items. All subsequent studies have used total
scores, rather than the five-factor solution, generally reporting acceptable internal consistency
coefficients (see Table 2). In the present study, items were rated on a 5-point scale, ranging
from 1 (Definitely not true) to 5 (Definitely true). Higher scores on this measure reflect greater
generic conspiracist ideation. GCBS items are reported in Table 6.
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One-Item Conspiracy Measure. We included the one-item conspiracy measure [18]. In
this measure, participants are first presented with instructions that allude to some political and
social events being debated. Participants are then asked to rate the following item: “I think that
the official version of the events given by authorities very often hides the truth”. The item was
rated on a 9-point scale, ranging from 1 (Completely false) to 9 (Completely true), so that higher
scores reflect greater generic conspiracist ideation.
Table 5. Items and factor loadings for the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire.
Item Factor1
5. I think that there are secret organizations that greatly influence political decisions. .85
4. I think that events which superficially seem to lack a connection are often the result of secret
activities.
.85
1. I think that many very important things happen in the world, which the public is never informed
about.
.79
3. I think that government agencies closely monitor all citizens. .77
2. I think that politicians usually do not tell us the true motives for their decisions. .70
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172617.t005
Table 4. Items and factor loadings for the Belief in Conspiracy Theory Inventory.
Item Factor 1 Factor 2
8. The US government allowed the 9/11 attacks to take place so that it would have an
excuse to achieve foreign (e.g., wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) and domestic (e.g.,
attacks on civil liberties) goals that had been determined prior to the attacks.
.81 -.06
5. The assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., was the result of an organised
conspiracy by US government agencies such as the CIA and FBI.
.78 -.07
4. US agencies intentionally created the AIDS epidemic and administered it to Black
and gay men in the 1970s.
.77 .02
15. Government agencies in the UK are involved in the distribution of illegal drugs to
ethnic minorities.
.76 -.26
3. The US government had foreknowledge about the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbour, but allowed the attack to take place so as to be able to enter the Second
World War.
.71 -.19
11. Princess Diana’s death was not an accident, but rather an organised assassination
by members of the British royal family who disliked her.
.61 .16
1. A powerful and secretive group, known as the New World Order, are planning to
eventually rule the world through an autonomous world government, which would
replace sovereign government.
.69 .14
2. SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) was produced under laboratory
conditions as a biological weapon.
.67 .25
13. The Coca Cola company intentionally changed to an inferior formula with the intent
of driving up demand for their classic product, later reintroducing it for their financial
gain.
.66 -.12
9. The assassination of John F. Kennedy was not committed by the lone gunman, Lee
Harvey Oswald, but was rather a detailed, organised conspiracy to kill the President.
.65 .25
6. The Apollo moon landings never happened and were staged in a Hollywood film
studio.
.65 .17
12. The Oklahoma City bombers, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, did not act
alone, but rather received assistance from neo-Nazi groups.
.64 -.01
14. Special interest groups are suppressing, or have suppressed in the past,
technologies that could provide energy at reduced cost or reduced pollution output.
.62 -.08
7. Area 51 in Nevada, US, is a secretive military base that contains hidden alien
spacecraft and/or alien bodies.
.57 .72
10. In July 1947, the US military recovered the wreckage of an alien craft from Roswell,
New Mexico, and covered up the fact.
.60 .69
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172617.t004
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9/11 conspiracy theories. As a measure of convergent validity, we included a subscale
from the 9/11 Conspiracist Beliefs Scale [6]. The parent scale consisted of 17 items, but the
authors [6] reported, using EFA, that the scale consists of two factors that measure general
9/11 conspiracist beliefs (10 items) and beliefs that the U.S. government conspired to cover-up
what happened on September 11, 2011 (7 items). In the present study, only the former subscale
was used, with items rated on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (Completely false) to 9 (Completely
true). To check that this subscale was indeed one-dimensional, we submitted the 10 items to
principal-axis EFA using the total sample (N = 803). Bartlett’s test of sphericity, χ2(45) =
9453.29, p< .001, and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy,
KMO = .96, indicated that the 10 items had adequate common variance for factor analysis. An
EFA with quartimax rotation revealed a single factor (λ = 7.90, variance explained = 79.0%),
with all items having excellent loadings ( .81). An overall subscale score was, therefore, com-
puted as the mean of the relevant 10 items, so that higher scores reflect greater endorsement of
general 9/11 conspiracist beliefs. Swami et al. [6] reported that this subscale had acceptable
internal consistency (Cronbach α = .95) and good patterns of construct and convergent valid-
ity. In the present study, Cronbach α for this scale was .97.
Anti-vaccination conspiracy theories. As a second measure of convergent validity, we
included an 8-item measure of belief in anti-vaccination conspiracy theories [13]. All items
were rated on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). In the
Table 6. Items and factor loadings for the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale. Values in bold indicate
items that loaded onto a factor.
Item Factor 1 Factor 2
3. The government uses people as patsies to hides its involvement in criminal
activities.
.79 .20
15. A lot of important information is deliberately concealed from the public out of self-
interest.
.79 .12
1. The government is involved in the murder of innocent citizens and/or well-known
public figures, and keeps this a secret.
.76 .26
14. New and advanced technology which would harm current industry is being
suppressed.
.74 .18
2. The government permits or perpetrates acts of terrorism on its own soil, disguising
its involvement.
.70 .40
13. Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence in order to
deceive the public.
.69 .34
4. The power held by heads of state is second to that of small, unknown groups who
really control world politics.
.66 .45
12. Experiments involving new drugs or technologies are routinely carried out on the
public without their knowledge or consent.
.66 .57
6. Certain significant events have been the result of the activity of a small group who
secretly manipulate world events.
.62 .51
10. The spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the result of deliberate, concealed
efforts of some organisations.
.58 .57
7. Secret organisations communicate with extraterrestrials, but keep this fact from the
public.
.18 .84
9. Some UFO sightings and rumours are planned or staged in order to distract the
public from real alien contact.
.23 .83
8. Evidence of alien contact is being kept from the public. .21 .81
11. Technology with mind-control capacities is used on people without their
knowledge.
.36 .62
5. A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major world decisions,
such as going to war.
.55 .57
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172617.t006
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parent study, the authors [13] reported that total scores on the scale had acceptable internal
consistency (Cronbach α = .85), but neglected to examine the scale’s factor structure. We
therefore subjected the 8 items to principal-axis EFA using the total sample. Bartlett’s test of
sphericity, χ2(28) = 5306.46, p< .001, and the KMO measure of sampling adequacy, KMO =
.90, indicated that the 8 items had adequate common variance for factor analysis. We initially
computed a principal-axis EFA with quartimax rotation, but because the results indicated a
multi-dimensional factor structure, we repeated the analysis using varimax rotation. The
results indicated two factors with λ> 1.0 (3.37 and 2.87, respectively) and parallel analysis
indicated that both factors should be extracted. Item loadings are reported in S1 Table. Four
items loaded onto the primary factor, which tapped the belief that vaccinations are used as a
population tracking mechanism (Cronbach α = .92, 42.1% of the variance explained). Four
items loaded onto a secondary factor, tapping the belief that the dangers of vaccinations are
being covered-up; however, two of these items also cross-loaded onto the primary factor, leav-
ing two items in the secondary factor. Because Tabachnick and Fidell [29] do not recommend
the use of subscales with less than three items, we elected to discard the secondary factor. The
retained subscale included 4 items that tap the conspiracist belief that vaccinations are being
used as population tracking mechanism (Cronbach α = .92).
Demographics. Participants provided their demographic details consisting of sex, age,
current marital status, highest educational qualifications, and ethnicity.
Statistical analyses
Exploratory factor analysis. We used a two-step procedure to examine the factor struc-
tures of the BCTI, GCBS, and CMQ. First, data from one-half of the sample (n = 402) was ran-
domly selected via a computer-generated random seed. The factor structures of the three
scales were then assessed using principal-axis EFA for this subsample using SPSS v.22. This
method allowed us to test for the best-fitting model for our dataset, without a priori limitations
in terms of modelling [30]. The sample size for all three scales met conservative 10:1 partici-
pant-to-item requirements for EFA [9]. Following standard guidelines [31], items were sub-
mitted to EFA if they passed standard criteria for item distribution (standardised kurtosis
values> 10.0 suggest a problem), average correlation with the other items (items with r< .40
should be dropped), and item-total correlation (items should be dropped with corrected-item
total correlations are < .30). For the BCTI and CMQ, we used quartimax rotations because of
the expectation of a single, orthogonal factor; for the GCBS, we used a varimax rotation
because we expected an inter-correlated, multidimensional model [32–33].
The number of factors to be extracted was determined by factor eigenvalues (λ) above 1.0
(the EGV1 criterion), examination of the scree-plot, and—where more than one factor was
identified through rotation—the results of parallel analysis [34]. The latter was used because
scree-plot inspection and the EGV1 criterion are known to lead to over-extraction of factors
[35]. Parallel analysis works by creating random datasets with the same number of cases and
variables as the actual dataset [36] Factors in the actual data are only retained if their eigenval-
ues are greater than the mean of eigenvalues from the random data [34]. Factor loadings were
interpreted using Tabachnick and Fidell’s [29] recommendations (i.e., > .71 = excellent,
> .63 = very good,> .55 = good, > .45 = fair, and> .32 = poor).
Confirmatory factor analysis. Data from the second split-half subsample (n = 401) was
submitted for CFA using the Analysis of Moment Structures Program (AMOS v.23) [37].
Hypothesised modelling was based on the results of the earlier EFA, as well as hypothesised
models from earlier studies where there were discrepancies. Standard goodness-of-fit indices
were selected a priori to assess the measurement models. The normed model chi-square
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(χnormed) is reported with lower values of the overall model χ indicating goodness-of-fit. A
χnormed value of< 3.00 indicates good fit [38]. The Steiger-Lind root mean square error of
approximation (RMSEA) and its 90% confidence interval provide a correction for model com-
plexity. RMSEA values close to .06 indicate a good fit, with values ranging to .10 representing a
mediocre fit [38]. The standardised root mean square residual (SRMR) assesses the mean abso-
lute correlation residual and is a badness-of-fit index: the smaller the SRMR, the better the
model fit. A cut-off value for SRMR is recommended to be “close to” or < .09 [38]. The com-
parative fit index (CFI) measures the proportionate improvement in fit by comparing a target
model with a more restricted, nested baseline model. The CFI reflects a goodness-of-fit index
and is recommended to “close to” or > .95 for adequate fit [38]. Even so, these recommended
cut-off values should be considered subjective guidelines [39–40]. We also examined standard-
ised parameter estimates.
Factor loadings for CFA were interpreted using Comrey and Lee’s [41] recommendations
(i.e., > .71 = excellent, > .63 = very good, > .55 = good, > .45 = fair, and > .32 = poor). The
potential to improve the accuracy of each model was also evaluated through consultation of
modification indices. Modification indices are estimates that identify potentially significant
adjustments that could be made to the model (e.g., a covariance of the error terms for two
indicators [42]. However, any modification to the existing model should make theoretical
sense, rather than simply from analytical addition or subtraction of a parameter [43]. Fur-
ther, the fit of the model cannot be improved by allowing an indicator to load onto another
latent variable [44].
Supplemental analyses. For both subsamples, internal consistency coefficients were com-
puted using Cronbach α. Although Nunnally [9] is widely interpreted as indicating that an
internal consistency coefficient of .70 is acceptable, this is in fact a myth [45]. He, in fact, advo-
cated a more conservative cut-off of .80, which we applied here. To assess convergent validity,
we computed bivariate correlations between all included variables. According to Lipsey and
Wilson [46], correlations of .10 are considered small, correlations of .25 are considered
medium, and correlations of .40 are considered large.
Results
Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory
Exploratory factor analysis. The BCTI items were examined for normality of distribution
and were found to be lower than limits, pre-empting transformation. The size of Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy, KMO = .93, suggested that the BCTI
items had adequate common variance for factor analysis, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity,
χ2(105) = 3120.96, p< .001, indicated that the correlation matrix was factorable. The results of
the EFA revealed two factors with λ> 1.0 (7.11 and 1.33). However, inspection of the scree-
plot suggested one primary factor and a steep cut-off to the secondary factor. The results of
parallel analysis showed that the mean of the first λ for the random data was smaller than the
real data counterpart, whereas the mean of the second λ was larger than the second λ for the
real data. These findings suggest that a single factor should be extracted. All 15 items had good
loadings on this factor (see Table 4), which explained 47.4% of the total item variance. Cron-
bach α for the overall BCTI score, computed as the mean of all 15 items, was .92.
Confirmatory factor analysis. CFA was conducted on all 15 items of the BCTI, where all
items loaded onto a single latent variable, indicated by the initial EFA of the split-half subsam-
ple. Fit indices values were found to be: χ(90, N = 401) = 585.008, χnormed = 6.500, CFI = .824,
RMSEA = .117 with 90% CI = .108-.126, SRMR = .063. Since the fit indices values of analysis
were not found to be at acceptable intervals, suggested modification indices were taken into
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account to improve the model. Modification indices were consulted to free error covariances
between items #7 and #10. The standardised estimates of factor loadings for this modified
model were acceptable (see Fig 1 for the path diagram and standardised estimates). This one-
dimensional structure provided an acceptable fit to the data: χ(89, N = 401) = 278.638,
χnormed = 3.131, CFI = .933, RMSEA = .073 with 90% CI = .063-.083, SRMR = .047. We were,
therefore, able to compute an overall score as the mean of all 15 items. Cronbach α for the
overall score was. .91.
Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire
Exploratory factor analysis. Tests of normality of distribution showed that the CMQ
items were lower than limits. The size of KMO measure of sampling adequacy, KMO = .96,
suggested that the BCTI items had adequate common variance for factor analysis, and Bart-
lett’s test of sphericity, χ2(10) = 956.54, p< .001, indicated that the correlation matrix was fac-
torable. The results of the EFA revealed a single factor with λ = 3.15, which explained 63.0% of
the variance. All 5 items had excellent loadings on this factor (see Table 5). Cronbach α for the
overall CMQ score, computed as the mean of all 5 items, was .85.
Confirmatory factor analysis. CFA was conducted on the 5 items of the CMQ, where all
items loaded onto a single latent variable. Fit indices values were found to be: χ(5, N = 401) =
194.646, χnormed = 38.929, CFI = .812, RMSEA = .308 with 90% CI = .272-.346, SRMR = .081.
Modification indices were consulted to free error covariances (items #1 and #2, and items #2
and #3). The standardised estimates of factor loadings for this model were acceptable (see Fig 2
for the path diagram and standardised estimates). This one-dimensional structure provided
poor fit to the data: χ(3, N = 401) = 22.859, χnormed = 7.620, CFI = .980, RMSEA = .129 with
90% CI = .083-.180, SRMR = .028. These results suggest that one-dimensional factor structure
of the CMQ in this split-half subsample was problematic and did not achieve adequate fit indi-
ces. For this reason, we did not compute a total score for this split-half subsample.
Fig 1. Path diagram and estimates for the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory. Item numbers in the
figure reflect the item number in Table 4. The large circle is the latent construct, with the rectangles
representing measured variables, and the small circles with numbers are the residual variables (variances).
The factor loadings are standardised in parenthesises, and the unstandarised values outside, with both being
reported following the guidelines of Kline [42]. Significance levels were determined by critical ratios (all p <
.001). The factor loadings were fixed at the indicated value (1.00a).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172617.g001
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Exploratory factor analysis. The GCBS items were examined for normality of distribu-
tion and were found to be lower than limits. The size of the KMO (.94) and Bartlett’s test of
sphericity, χ2(105) = 4292.37, p< .001, showed that the 15 GCBS items had adequate common
variance for EFA. The results of the EFA revealed only two factors with λ> 1.0 (5.50 and 4.19)
and the scree-plot showed a steep cut-off between the primary and secondary factors. How-
ever, the results of parallel analysis indicated that both factors should be extracted: the mean of
the first and second λ for the random data were smaller than the real data counterparts. Eleven
items loaded onto the first factor and 10 items loaded onto the second factor, but of these 5
items cross-loaded onto both factors (see Table 6). Tabachnick and Fidell [29] recommended
that all cross-loading items should be eliminated, leaving 6 items for the first factor (Cronbach
α = .89) and 4 for the second (Cronbach α = .85). Because of the diversity of items that loaded
onto the first factor, we termed this factor General Conspiracist Beliefs. Three of the four items
that loaded on the second factor related to extraterrestrial beliefs, so we termed this factor
Extraterrestrial Conspiracist Beliefs.
Confirmatory factor analysis. Using CFA, we tested three separate models for the GCBS:
a one-factor model where all 15 items loaded onto a single latent variable, a five-factor model
where the 15 items loaded onto the five factors as per the parent study [22], and a 10-item,
two-factor model as indicated by the initial EFA of the split-half subsample. Fit indices for the
one-factor model were found to be poor: χ(90, N = 401) = 1122.934, χnormed = 12.477, CFI =
.751, RMSEA = .169 with 90% CI = .161-.178, SRMR = .089. Modification indices were con-
sulted to free error covariances (items #5 and #6, #8 and #9, and #14 and #15). However, the fit
of this one-dimensional structure remained poor: χ(87, N = 401) = 652.389, χnormed = 7.499,
CFI = .864, RMSEA = .127 with 90% CI = .118-.137, SRMR = .074 (see Fig 3 for standardised
estimates of factor loadings). Based on these results, we concluded that there is little support
for a one-dimensional structure of the GBCS.
Next, we examined the fit of the 15-item, five-factor model proposed by Brotherton et al.
(2013). The fit indices for this structure were also found to be poor: χ(80, N = 401) = 1038.819,
χnormed = 12.985, CFI = .769, RMSEA = .173 with 90% CI = .164-.183, SRMR = .090. Modifica-
tion indices were not consulted to adjust the model as all modifications would lead to indica-
tors being loaded onto another latent variable or have little theoretical sense. Fig 4 depicts the
Fig 2. Path diagram and estimates for the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire. Item numbers in the
figure reflect the item number in Table 5. The large circle is the latent construct, with the rectangles
representing measured variables, and the small circles with numbers are the residual variables (variances).
The factor loadings are standardised in parenthesises, and the unstandarised values outside, with both being
reported following the guidelines of Kline [42]. Significance levels were determined by critical ratios (all p <
.001). The factor loadings were fixed at the indicated value (1.00a).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172617.g002
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Fig 3. Path diagram and estimates for the one-factor Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale. Item numbers
in the figure reflect the item number in Table 6. Item numbers in the figure reflect the item number in Table 6.
The large circle is the latent construct, with the rectangles representing measured variables, and the small
circles with numbers are the residual variables (variances). The factor loadings are standardised in
parenthesises, and the unstandarised values outside, with both being reported following the guidelines of
Kline (2011). Significance levels were determined by critical ratios (all p < .001). The factor loadings were
fixed at the indicated value (1.00a).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172617.g003
Fig 4. Path diagram and estimates for the five-factor Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale. Item numbers
in the figure reflect the item number in Table 6. The large circles are the latent construct, with the rectangles
representing measured variables, and the small circles with numbers are the residual variables (variances).
The factor loadings are standardised in parenthesises, and the unstandarised values outside, with both being
reported following the guidelines of Kline [42]. Significance levels were determined by critical ratios (all p <
.001). Estimates of covariance between exogenous variables are displayed in italics. The factor loadings were
fixed at the indicated value (1.00a).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172617.g004
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factor structure and standardised estimates of factor loadings for the five-factor model. Based
on these results, we concluded that the five-factor model should be discarded.
Finally, the 10 items that were retained in a two-factor structure from the first split-half sub-
sample was analysed. This model was also found to have poor fit: χ(34, N = 401) = 261.125,
χnormed = 7.680, CFI = .902, RMSEA = .129 with 90% CI = .115-.144, SRMR = .080. Modifica-
tion indices were consulted to free error covariances between items under the same factor
between items #14 and #15. The standardised estimates of factor loadings for this model were
acceptable (see Fig 5 for the path diagram and standardised estimates). The resulting two-fac-
tor structure was more acceptable in terms of fit, though still problematic on a number of indi-
ces: χ(33, N = 401) = 191.556, χnormed = 5.805, CFI = .931, RMSEA = .110 with 90% CI = .095-
.125, SRMR = .076. These results suggest that, even following modifications, the two-factor
model of the GCBS continued to have poor fit and so was omitted from further analyses.
Convergent validity
Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in Table 7. We computed inter-scale, bivari-
ate correlations between all variables for the EFA and CFA split-halves separately. As can be
seen in Table 7, there were significant inter-correlations between all variables for the EFA
split-half, but evidence of convergent validity was strongest for the BCTI and weakest for the
CMQ and one-item conspiracy measure. There were also significant inter-correlations
between all variables for the CFA-split half. However, evidence of convergent validity was
strongest for the BCTI and weakest for the one-item conspiracy measure.
Discussion
In this study, we examined the factorial and convergent validity of four different scales used to
measure conspiracist ideation. In very broad outline, our results highlight concerns with the
Fig 5. Path diagram and estimates for the two-factor Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale. Item numbers
in the figure reflect the item number in Table 6. The large circles are the latent construct, with the rectangles
representing measured variables, and the small circles with numbers are the residual variables (variances).
The factor loadings are standardised in parenthesises, and the unstandarised values outside, with both being
reported following the guidelines of Kline [42]. Significance levels were determined by critical ratios (all p <
.001). Estimates of covariance between exogenous variables are displayed in italics. The factor loadings were
fixed at the indicated value (1.00a).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172617.g005
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ways in which conspiracist ideation is currently operationalised and measured in the future.
Here, we begin by discussing our findings in relation to each of the four included measures,
before turning our attention to the future.
Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory
Of the four measures we included in the present work, the BCTI showed the strongest evidence
of factorial validity. Using EFA, we found support for the idea that the scale reduces to a single
dimension, onto which all items load adequately. In addition, using CFA, we found that the
one-dimensional model of the BCTI had acceptable fit and, in both sub-samples, overall scores
had acceptable internal consistency. This is perhaps not surprising when we consider that
belief in conspiracy theories is thought to be monological; that is, endorsement of one conspir-
acy theory makes acceptance of other conspiracy theories more likely [6, 8, 26]. In addition, of
the four scales, the BCTI showed the strongest correlations with measures used to establish
convergent validity. Of course, the main limitation of the BCTI is a conceptual one: it is uncer-
tain to what extent the measure truly taps conspiracist ideation, as opposed to endorsement of
a range of conspiracy theories (in the present study, correlations with generic measures of con-
spiracist ideation were generally strong). It is also unclear to what extent the BCTI will remain
temporally stable in the long-term, as individual items may become obsolete, or to what extent
individual items will be cross-culturally relevant.
Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire
In our EFA, we found that the 5 items of the CMQ reduced to a single dimension with accept-
able internal consistency. However, using CFA, we found that the one-dimensional model had
poor fit, even following modifications. Moreover, in the EFA sub-sample, evidence of conver-
gent validity was moderate at best. We believe the poor factorial and convergent validity of the
CMQ may reflect underlying problems with the construct validity of this measure. Specifically,
we suggest that some items of the CMQ may not tap conspiracist ideation, but may reflect
rational beliefs about the current state of the world. For example, given current knowledge,
item #3 (“I think that government agencies closely monitor all citizens”) could be construed as
factual and requires no conspiracist mentality. The high mean scores for this measure (well
above the scale mid-point) suggest that participants in this study were indeed rating some
items of the CMQ as factually correct. In short, we suggest that there may be underlying prob-
lems with the construct validity of the CMQ, which affects its latent dimensionality.
Table 7. Bivariate Correlations between all measures included in the present study (EFA Split-Half Subsample in the Top Diagonal, CFA Split-Half
Subsample in the Bottom Diagonal).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) M SD
(1) Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory .64 .75 .80 .71 .78 .65 5.57 1.85
(2) Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire .71 .75 .55 .68 .53 .33 7.55 1.86
(3) GBCS—General Beliefs - - .60 .74 .64 .40 3.21 0.99
(4) GCBS—Extraterrestrial Beliefs .72 - - .58 .66 .58 2.28 1.07
(5) One-Item Conspiracy Measure .71 - - - .40 .36 5.68 2.31
(6) 9/11 Conspiracist Beliefs .75 - - - .32 .68 2.95 2.24
(7) Anti-Vaccination Beliefs .53 - - - .24 .66 1.82 1.34
M 3.62 - - - 5.40 2.96 1.72
SD 1.76 - - - 2.43 2.18 1.00
Note. All p < .001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0172617.t007
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Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale
In the parent study [22], the GCBS developers suggested that this scale consists of five fac-
tors and that the five-factor model had better fit than overall scores. In the present work, we
failed to find support for either of these models using both EFA and CFA. Instead, our EFA
suggested a truncated, two-factor model should be extracted. However, our CFA suggested
that none of the models of the GCBS had adequate fit even following modifications, sugges-
tive of inherent problems with the dimensionality of this measure. It is possible that part of
the problem with this measure is confusion about its latent structure and whether it taps a
single or multiple dimensions of conspiracist ideation (see below). At best, the GCBS may
tap different dimensions of conspiracist ideation (e.g., general conspiracist ideation versus
conspiracist beliefs about extraterrestrial life); at worst, it may tap multiple dimensions that
do not cohere very well. Overall, the present findings raise concerns about the use of this
measure.
One-Item Conspiracy Measure
We were unable to assess the factorial validity of the measure developed by Lantian et al. [18],
given its single-item nature. However, our assessment of its convergent validity returned less
than ideal results. This was to be expected given the inherently low reliability of any one-item
measure, regardless of its content and purpose. Of the four measures included here, correla-
tions between the one-item conspiracy measure and indices of convergent validity were the
weakest.
Looking to the future
One general conclusion that might be drawn on the basis of the present dataset is that, while
endorsement of a range of conspiracy theories is indeed monological, there are problems with
the measurement of conspiracist ideation in scales currently in use. It is possible that the CMQ
and GCBS are modelling a substantial amount of noise (e.g., measurement error, sampling
fluctuations) and that latent factor structures depend on arbitrary properties in the data. As a
result, the uncovered factor structures associated with these scales may differ between studies
(as in the case between our dataset and earlier studies) or within studies (as in the differences
between our EFA and CFA subsamples). The most straightforward solution here is that, where
scholars use the CMQ or GCBS, they should examine the factor structures of these scales in
their dataset rather than assuming these measures are one-dimensional.
Beyond this general point, we do not recommend the use of the CMQ and the one-item
conspiracy measure in future studies. The CMQ appears to have poor factorial validity (and
likely poor construct validity), whereas the one-item conspiracy measure appears to have weak
convergent validity. Scholars who wish to measure generic conspiracist ideation may find it
better to use the GCBS, but they should pay careful attention to (and report) its factor structure
within studies. Our findings suggest the possibility that conspiracist ideation may be multi-
dimensional and, as a result, scholars should not assume that the GBCS—or other measures of
conspiracist ideation—are necessarily one-dimensional. More broadly, we suggest that there
may utility in returning to a more careful consideration of theory, especially the conceptualisa-
tion of conspiracist ideation as a latent trait.
One way to resolve these issues would be to return to the 75 items developed by Brotherton
et al. [22], and submit these items to exploratory factor analysis using a suitably large sample
(i.e., a sample of no less than 750 individuals [9]. Doing so may highlight alternative factor
structures that could then be re-assessed using CFA. Another way forward would be to subject
all the items from conceptually similar scales (e.g., the CMQ and GCBS) to a single factor
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analysis, to examine the extent of conceptual overlap and possible item redundancy. In addi-
tion, future studies may also wish to revisit the factorial validity of the Conspiracy Theory
Belief Scale, which we omitted in the present work. More broadly, we strongly recommend
that all scholars working on conspiracist ideation pay closer attention to issues of measure-
ment. Our data suggest that insufficient attention has been given to factorial and convergent
validity, and that this may have introduced a degree of measurement bias into previously-
reported findings. Indeed, it was concerning that even one of our measures of convergent
validity [13] had not been submitted to factor analysis and that we found a divergent structure
to what the authors of the parent study had assumed. Looking ahead, we highlight the need for
improved assessments of the psychometric properties of scales used to measure conspiracist
ideation. At a minimum, we recommend the reporting of factor analytic findings for all mea-
sures, particularly novel scales.
Limitations and conclusion
One might argue that our findings are less reliable, for whatever reason, compared to the
parents studies reported in Tables 1–3. Even were this the case, however, our findings highlight
discrepancies in factorial validity that cannot, and should not, be overlooked. Indeed, our
study benefits from a relatively large, culturally homogeneous sample and a two-step assess-
ment of factorial validity. Nevertheless, there were limitations to the present study, too. First,
our use of an online sample means that we cannot be certain about the generalisability of our
findings. In particular, the present results may be geographically and culturally limited. In
addition, we did not assess the temporal stability of the four measures, and this could be use-
fully (re)examined in future studies. Including alternative, and a broader range of, measures of
convergent validity would also be a welcome addition in future studies.
In addition, because our sample was self-selecting, the possibility of sampling biases should
be considered (e.g., those who were most interested in the topic may have been more likely to
participate and complete the survey without dropping-out). Likewise, the inclusion of idiosyn-
cratic instructions typically included with each measure may have also led to biased results,
and this is something that future studies should consider. These limitations notwithstanding,
the present findings suggest that scholars working on conspiracist ideation need to pay more
detailed attention to measurement issues in their studies. If the findings from this field of
research are to be taken seriously, measurement issues need to be thoughtfully considered and
dealt with by scholars. For now, we suggest that scholars wishing to measure conspiracist idea-
tion may need to return to the drawing board.
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